I. INTRODUCTION Military technologies for fighting wars have made remarkable progress in the last decade. For example, the accuracy of missiles has improved considerably as cruise missiles use terrain mapping techniques, submarine launched ballistic missiles use guidance from stellar locations, and other missiles will use the accurate locations and velocities from the NAVSTAR global positioning satellites. Along with this progress, there has also been considerable progress in the technologies (1) which allow the monitoring of the military activities and systems of &dquo;the other side.&dquo;
These new technologies are not only extremely interesting in a scientific sense, but they are also encouraging in that they have strengthened the ability to verify compliance with the provisions of arms control treaties. These improvements have been both in quality, with better resolution and data management, and in scope, with new methods of measuring.
In the past, when there have been disagreements over compliance with existing treaties, confidential discussions have been held between the Americans and the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). Recently both sides have complained publicly about the compliance of the other side with various treaties.
It appears that future progress on arms control treaties will depend on the resolution of some of these issues.
For this reason, we feel that it is timely to discuss the progress on some of the technical means of verification. Part of this paper is derived from a conference (and book) (2) If the film quality were to be improved to 1000 lines/mm (ri = 1 ~), the theoretical resolution obtained through Eq. 1 3. Nonspherical lens can be machined with the aid of computers to take into account deviations in the physical and geometrical properties of the glass. 4 . Stresses from temperature and pressure gradients can distort a lens system. By using improved lens mounting materials and improved thermal insulation materials, such as a blanket of 100 layers of metal coated mylar, these problems have been minimized.
5. The forward motion of a satellite will slightly blur a photograph. This smearing is removed by slightly moving the film relative to the lens with precise timing mechanisms and servo control systems. 6 . Similar objects can reflect and emit differently in the visible and infrared wavelength regions.
Multispectral cameras are used to record these differences in the colors by using a series of nearly identical lenses in combination with narrow-pass filters. Nine or more separate photographs are taken to record the different wavelength images,orspecial-layered multispectral films are used for one composite picture. 
Digital Image Processing
The computer revolution has spawned great improvements in the ability to enhance (7) g(x,y)= ff hc (xl-x,yl-y) s(xl,yl) dx, dy,
where s is the direct and indirect flux at the sensor, and n is the noise.
One way to determine the point-spread is to Fourier transform the image to obtain the image as a two-dimensional frequency distribution. By ignoring the noise term in Eq. 4, one obtains
where u and v are the spatial 1 frequencies,and G,H, and S are the Fourier transforms of g, h, and s.
Charge-Coupled Devices (CCD)
The use of film in a real-time mode in reconnaissance satellites causes some difficulties; the film must be read either by a television camera or a fiber optics reader; both of these methods blur the resolution of very good film.
In order to retain the good resolution of high quality films, the film can be sent to the earth in a film canister for analysis.
However (6) from low earth orbit would give a ground resolution of about 2-3 m. The ir devices measure the accumulated charge at a pixel due to the thermal intensity.
The best available temperature sensitivity is about 0.01 K from a body at 300 K, which requires a voltage measurement accurate to A(aT4 )/(aT4 ) = (4)(AT/T) = (4)(0.01/300) = 0.01%.
(7)
The achievable accuracy from a satellite will be diminished by the atmosphere and it will depend on the sweep speed of the device as well as other parameters. Ground-based radars can be used to monitor re-entry vehicles and satellites.
An inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) is effectively created as the re-entry vehicle approaches the radar. As the RV rotates, it is possible to determine some aspects of its shape by using the motion of the RV to increase the effective size of the antenna as in the case of SAR. These techniques can be used to determine sizes to determine if &dquo;new classes&dquo; of missiles are being tested.
The SALT II treaty places a limit on the number of RVs that are tested on each type of missile.
Such testing can be monitored by large phased array radars (PAR), like the Cobra Dane radar that use an array of 34,769 small radiating and detecting elements to track simultaneously up to 100 objects, the size of a grapefruit, at a distance of the order of 2000 km.
By varying the phases between the individual radiators and detectors, the radar beam can be steered onto the target. Digital processing techniques similar to those used for photographs are used to enhance the resolution.
The PAR Cobra Judy radar is mounted on the stern of the USNS Observation Island. It can move around on the ocean and monitor various properties of re-entry vehicles such as their mass and missile coefficient (a measure of its accuracy), as well as count the number of re-entry vehicles released by a single missile.
PAR radars also can be used for early warning and space tracking, as well as for battle management of anti-satellite and ballistic missile defense systems.
VI. NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 was the first major arms control treaty signed by the U.S., U.K. and the U.S.S.R. Since the LTBT forbids nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in the sea, or in space it forces nuclear weapons tests to be held underground. It is an interesting fact of history that the U.S. Senate decisively ratified (88 to 19) the LTBT before launching the first VELA satellites which were needed to verify compliance with the treaty provisions against explosions above the atmosphere.
(Seismographs and other equipment could verify explosions in and below the atmosphere.) For U(w) = (a3Pov)/(cr)(v2 -0.075a2w2 + ivaw) (9) where the compressional velocity v = 4 km/s, the elastic pressure limit of the media is Po (440 bars for salt), a is the size of the cavity for elastic behavior, and c is a constant. The low frequency limit (w« v/a) does not depend on w while the high frequency limit is proportional to w-2. The corner frequency of an explosion occurs at higher frequencies than that of an earthquake of equivalent low frequency p-wave amplitudes because the explosion takes place more quickly and in a smaller volume. The decoupling of an explosion in a cavity shifts the &dquo;corner frequency&dquo; (Figure 1 ) to higher frequencies, resulting in greatly reduced decoupling at the higher frequencies.
Thus, a decoupled explosion might have its amplitude reduced by about a factor of up to 200 at low frequencies below the corner frequency, but by only a factor of about 8 above the corner frequency. Figure 1 shows that the amplitude of earthquakes falls off more rapidly with frequency that is the case for explosions, so that at higher frequencies, in the region above 30 Hertz, the earthquake amplitudes are less important.
These data show that the reductions of the amplitudes of the decoupled explosions are relatively less at the higher frequencies. The high frequency components can be used to detect and identify decoupled explosions down to about less than 1 kiloton (11), or 3-10 kilotons (12) Figure 2 
